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In Australia, as with Great Britain, governments have shown rising concern with the health of 
competitive residential electricity markets.  A core concern is the practice of price 
discrimination and the rising dispersion of prices.  The State of Queensland implemented Full 
Retail Contestability in 2007, but held a regulated price cap in place until 2016, when it 
finally deregulated its residential electricity market.  Almost simultaneously, the two 
jurisdictions that pioneered retail price deregulation, Great Britain and Victoria, were 
questioning their prior policy decision.  Queensland makes for a fascinating case study 
because Southeast Queensland comprises a fully deregulated retail market while Regional 
Queensland is a regulated monopoly – with common input costs across both zones.  
Consequently, a regulated monopoly with a uniform tariff and 640,000 customers forms a 
very large control group, which can be directly compared to the competitive market of more 
than 1.3 million customers – making such analysis globally unique.  Analysis of Queensland 
market conditions concludes the policy is welfare enhancing.  To be clear, rising electricity 
prices are a problem, but price discrimination is not.  The deregulated competitive market is, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, better at regulating the overall average tariff and consumer welfare 
has been enhanced by $184 million per annum – with some consumer segments very 
materially better off.  However, certain modes of failure remain, viz. an inter-consumer 
misallocation problem and lack of transparency vis-à-vis the anchoring of discounts – known 
as the “discounts off what?” problem.  Resolving the inter-consumer misallocation problem 
is relatively straight forward via ensuring energy retailers (voluntarily) move vulnerable 
customers onto a Benchmark-equivalent or suitably discounted tariff.  Due to the non-
linearity of tariffs and the rising mix of discrete metered loads, the latter can be best solved 
by producing a weighted average of Standing Offers, and using this as the benchmark. 
 
Keywords:  Price discrimination, electricity prices, jawboning.   
 
1. Introduction 
When contestability commences in the mass market segment of a retail electricity market1, 
prices commence a natural drift from a regulated and uniform (two-part) tariff to 
discriminatory prices – this arises in energy markets due to the policy design of vesting 
incumbent retailers with a default tariff, and contestability arising via rival retailer discounts 
(see Giulietti et al. 2005; IPART, 2013; Simshauser, 2014; Waddams Price & Zhu, 2015; 
Littlechild, 2016; Waddams Price & Zhu, 2016; He & Reiner, 2017; Nelson et al. 2018; 
Flores & Waddams Price, 2018).  A market progression of rival entry, greater product 
complexity and price dispersion is common in former regulated capital-intensive monopoly 
industries such as telecommunications, airlines and energy as Borenstein & Rose (1994), 
Dana (1998, 1999b), Levine (2002), Baumol & Swanson (2003), Littlechild (2014) and 
Simshauser & Whish-Wilson (2017) explain.  Thus, while regulated retail price caps are 
initially retained as a proxy safety-net for inactive small consumers as the market shifts from 
single monopoly provider to competitive market, the regulated default tariff or “Standing 
Offer” forms a price-to-beat.  Rival and new entrant retailers entering a franchise service area 
will offer discounts off the incumbent’s Standing Offer tariff in order to poach customers.  
Incumbents are forced to construct their own discounted matching-products in response.  
                                                          
 Professor of Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University.  Views expressed in this article are those of the author.   
 Associate, Energy Policy Research Group, University of Cambridge. 
1 To ensure an orderly transition, competition in retail electricity markets occurs progressively with a timetable comprising 4-6 
Tranches of consumers spanning a 4-8 year window.  In Great Britain, retail market contestability started in the early-1990s with 
the residential market made contestable in 1999, and price controls removed in 2002 (Littlechild, 2016).  In the NEM 
contestability varied by region, viz: Victoria 1994-2002, New South Wales 1996-2002; Queensland 1998-2007, South Australia 
1998-2003.  Price controls in these NEM regions were removed in 2009, 2014, 2016 and 2013 respectively. 
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Discounts off a Standing Offer tariff and associated price dispersion are thus a central design 
feature of a fully contestable retail electricity market.   
 
Considerable evidence exists to suggest the success of Full Retail Contestability is 
inextricably linked to expected gains from switching supplier.  Gains to residential consumers 
are most visibly expressed as a “percentage discount off2” the existing Standing Offer tariff.  
This rivalrous process hinges critically on the existence of the Standing Offer, from which 
discounted products are anchored.   
 
When the mass market is deemed workably competitive the requirement for an independent 
regulator to set a regulated Standing Offer price cap no longer exists.  Incumbent retailers – 
who retain an obligation to supply3 in their former franchise area – must ensure a Standing 
Offer tariff (and associated default levels of service) is available at all times.  The critical 
difference pre- and post-price deregulation is that incumbent retailers are free to select the 
price-to-beat.  As Littlechild (2017) explains, this residential market liberalisation template 
was largely pioneered by Great Britain (1999) and the Victorian (2002) region of Australia’s 
National Electricity Market (NEM).   
 
When retail prices are deregulated, the number of rival suppliers will expand rapidly because 
key business risks (i.e. regulatory risk, regulatory mistakes, dynamic inconsistency) have, at 
least in theory, been removed.  Consequently, an incumbent retailer will not only encounter 
traditional incumbent rivals from adjacent service areas, but additional new entrant “2nd Tier” 
retailers.  Starting without a franchise customer base, 2nd Tier retailers accumulate customers 
based on various customer-focused strategies such as low-cost, on-line or renewable energy 
models.4   
 
Energy retailers further segment consumer groupings well beyond coarse historic segments of 
Commercial & Industrial, Small Business and Residential.  Sophisticated retailers might 
dissect Residentials into six or more sub-segments, for example, 1) affluent urban 
professionals, 2) budget conscious families, 3) pensioners, 4) socially conscious households; 
5) time-poor families; and 6) tech-savvy households.  Products, product bundles and 
marketing channels to market are specifically constructed to target customers in these discrete 
sub-segments.  Furthermore, some households have solar PV, and/or controlled load (i.e. 
ripple control) associated with swimming pool pumps and hot water systems.  Each metering 
combination requires discrete product bundles.   
 
Consequently, with the number of retailers expanding, consumer sub-segments multiplying, 
and the mix of discrete household metered loads rising, the number of products necessarily 
proliferates.  Product proliferation is driven by customer needs and competitive intensity, i.e. 
retailers design products to attack rivals, and to defend their own customers from competitor 
poaching.  
  
As Queensland was removing price controls in 2016, Victoria and Great Britain, the 
jurisdictions which pioneered Full Retail Contestability and retail price deregulation, were 
investigating whether to reinstate the price controls that Queensland was removing.  The 
British regulator (Ofgem) had instigated various formal market investigations and policy 
constraints from 2008 before handing the problem to the British Competition and Markets 
Authority (see Ofgem, 2008, 2011; Littlechild, 2016b; CMA, 2016).  Victoria established a 
formal inquiry into the efficacy of its deregulation policy (Thwaites et al. 2017) and the 
Commonwealth Government initiated a formal review of retail electricity markets (ACCC, 
2017).   
                                                          
2 British research revealed only 19% of consumers preferred wanted to stop discounts being expressed in percentage terms (cf. 
dollar savings).  In addition, the strongest driver of customer activity is the size of anticipated gains from switching – not the 
simplicity of offers available.  See Littlechild (2014) for details.  See also Giulietti et al. (2005), Flores & Waddams Price (2013), 
IPART (2013), Simshauser (2014), Littlechild (2014), Waddams Price & Zhu (2015), Littlechild (2016), Waddams Price & Zhu 
(2016), He & Reiner (2017), Flores & Waddams Price (2018). 
3 This is usually a condition of their retail licence. 
4 Heard (2017) argues that there are three tiers with 2nd Tier Retailers being highly successful new entrants (many of which have 
also vertically integrated) while the 3rd Tier represents the boutique sub-scale new entrants.  
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At the core of policymaker concerns in both countries were the evolution of residential prices.  
However, two distinct pricing characteristics appear to have been conflated, viz. (1) sharply 
rising prices, and (2) price discrimination and the associated dispersion of prices (see also 
Littlechild, 2017).  The difficulty for policymakers is that misdiagnosing price discrimination 
for policy treatment will inflame rising prices. 
   
When shifting from a regulated uniform monopoly price to a competitive market, the practice 
of price discrimination produces a wide array of prices and products.  To the non-economist, 
the term “price discrimination” can conjure negative sentiment.  Ofgem and Thwaites 
Reviews considered the practice produces unfair prices, creates confusion amongst 
consumers, and presents the opportunity for large incumbent retailers to exercise market 
power and price-gouge inactive customers (Ofgem, 2008, 2011; Thwaites et al. 2017).  But 
price discrimination is unremarkable in economics, is a predictable outcome of rising 
competition and is frequently welfare enhancing5.  Price discrimination is pervasive 
throughout the economy and forms a vital means by which non-trivial joint fixed and sunk 
costs are efficiently recovered by firms, especially in capital-intensive or “heavy” industries 
(see Dana, 1998; Levine, 2002; Elegido, 2011; Littlechild, 2017).   
 
Nonetheless, perceptions of fairness inevitably arise when a menu of tariffs emerge and 
deviate from an historic uniform price (Dana, 1998).  Deeply discounted tariffs are of course 
very popular.  In contrast, Standing Offer tariffs in a rising cost environment are, 
understandably, derided by consumer groups.  This in turn produces adverse media and 
political “focusing events”.  The intuitive policy response to these focus events is to stamp out 
the practice and limit Standing Offer tariffs to some lower level perceived to be fair.  Indeed, 
Prime Ministers of Britain and of Australia6 weighed-in on retail energy markets in 2017 with 
ill-advised policy thought-bubbles of shifting all customers en-masse to the cheapest tariff 
(He & Reiner, 2017; Littlechild, 2017).  Implementation of such a policy would surely see 
cheap tariffs disappear overnight, with serious welfare implications for low income customers 
who, by necessity, shop around for deep discounts. 
 
At this juncture, Official Advice given to policymakers on the welfare implications of 
intuitive interventions is critical because an intuitive policy response will almost certainly do 
more harm than good.  A long line of independent academic economists in Great Britain 
attempted to provide advice to British regulator Ofgem over the period 2009-2012 (see for 
example Vickers, 2009; Yarrow, 2009; Hviid & Waddams Price, 2012; Green, 2012) but were 
ignored at the time, and the consequences for British consumers were disastrous (Littlechild, 
2014, 2017; Pollitt & Haney, 2014; Waddams Price & Zhu, 2016; He & Reiner, 2017).   
 
The purpose of this article is to analyse retail market deregulation and in particular, whether 
Queensland’s 2016 policy initiative to deregulate prices represents sound policy.  Queensland 
represents a fascinating and globally unique case study because of its common input costs and 
dual retail zones representing the market extremes, Southeast Queensland is fully contestable 
and deregulated competitive market with 1.3 million customers, while Regional Queensland 
comprises a control group7 comprising 640,000 customers in a regulated monopoly supplier 
setting with a uniform tariff.  
 
Evidence presented in this article on the performance of the Southeast Queensland market 
supports the policy of deregulation.  Distributional effects are ambiguous, however.  There 
must be episodes of inter-consumer misallocations, albeit trivial at this stage.  But Southeast 
Queensland has certain advantages over its British and Victorian peers; (1) Southeast 
Queensland has benefited from Victorian and British experience; (2) in Southeast Queensland 
                                                          
5 The issue here is that setting uniform prices to average cost is known to produce deadweight losses whereas to the extent that 
price discrimination produces marginal prices below average cost and close to, or at, marginal cost then the resulting welfare 
outcomes can be expected to be improved.  See Simshauser & Whish-Wilson (2017).  
6 See http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/feel-the-power-malcolm-turnbull-summons-electricity-retailers-to-
canberra-for-summit-20170803-gxotv1.html  
7 As one reviewer noted, there are some obvious differences in the demographics of SE vs Regional QLD including levels of 
income, education, urban vs rural, renters vs owners and so on, and these variables are obviously not accounted for in the 
analysis. 
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a credible and visible “reference rate” exists (i.e. set for Regional Queensland); (3) rather than 
vacating the field when the market was deregulated, the Queensland Department of Energy 
retained its consumer market resourcing and remained highly engaged, including extensive 
jawboning of incumbent retailers (behind closed doors) in periods leading up to annual tariff 
changes; which (4) provided Queensland policymakers with the requisite evidence to deal 
with focus event-driven media. 
 
This article is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents a review of literature. Section 3 
analyses the Southeast Queensland market.  Section 4 reviews modes of failure.  Conclusions 
follow. 
 
2. Review of literature 
While the principles of differential pricing are generally attributed to Dupuit (1844) as a 
means by which to fund substantial sunk costs, the formal economic theory of price 
discrimination dates back to Pigou (1920), who defined first-, second- and third-degree8 price 
discrimination.  Robinson (1933) would describe strong consumer segments (i.e. low 
elasticity, higher price) and weak consumer segments (i.e. high elasticity, lower prices) while 
Stigler (1987) produced the economists’ preferred and generalised definition of the practice; 
viz. selling goods at different price-ratios to their underlying marginal costs. 
 
In simple terms, third-degree price discrimination involves raising prices in strong consumer 
segments, and lowering prices in weak consumer segments.  For price discrimination to 
persist, consumers must not be able to unravel price differentials (i.e. arbitrage is not 
possible), consumer segments must have an appreciable difference in their willingness-to-pay 
(i.e. strong and weak segments exist) and firms must have the ability to separate customer 
segments cleanly through accessing better customer information, acquiring new tariff 
instruments or marketing a menu of pricing structures (Pigou, 1920; Robinson, 1933; 
Armstrong, 2006b; Stole, 2007).   
 
Considerable economics literature exists which analyses welfare implications of second-
degree price discrimination in regulated electricity markets dating back to Clark (2011), 
Lewis (1941) and Coase (1946).  Hausman & Neufeld (1989) and Simshauser (2016) provide 
summaries of historical developments. However, third-degree price discrimination in 
residential electricity markets is a relatively new phenomenon with contestable retail 
electricity markets originating in Great Britain in 1999.  Consequently, analysis of third-
degree practices in electricity markets only came to prominence from 2009- onwards due to 
developments in the British and later, Victorian electricity markets9.   
2.1 Price discrimination and perceptions of fairness 
Second-degree price discrimination is rarely considered contentious because volume 
discounts are intuitively logical. But third-degree price discrimination is often viewed with 
negative sentiment by non-economists due to perceptions of fairness (Elegido, 2011; 
Marcoux, 2006; Simshauser & Whish-Wilson, 2017).  Bunzl’s10 (2010, p.9) definition and 
procedural concept of fairness specifically considered the electricity tariff case, based on the 
late-Harvard Professor John Rawls’ idealised theory of fairness and his famous phrase ‘from 
behind the veil of ignorance’, viz. public policy on energy pricing should be set not knowing 
whether you are rich or poor, renter or owner etc.  Felder (2010) explains fairness for 
residential electricity markets translates to a problem of selecting the default rate that 
                                                          
8 As Pigou (1920) notes, price discrimination comes in three forms (viz. first-, second- and third-degree) but the focus of this 
article is third-degree price discrimination.  With first-degree price discrimination, a monopolist sells to each customer at 
uniquely different prices at their absolute willingness-to-pay.  Second-degree price discrimination occurs when prices vary with 
the quantity purchased.  Third-degree price discrimination arises through intense market segmentation based on variations in 
consumer willingness-to-pay. See also Armstrong (2008) for further extensions. 
9 See for example Littlechild (2009, 2014, 2016, 2017), Davies et al. (2009), Hviid & Waddams Price (2012, 2014), Waddams 
Price & Zhu (2013, 2015, 2016), Flores & Waddams Price (2013), Pollitt & Haney (2014), He & Reiner (2017), Simshauser & 
Whish-Wilson (2017) and Nelson et al. (2018). 
10 Martin Bunzl is a Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University.  Brown, Faruqui & Grausz (2015) note that Rawls was widely 
regarded as the most significant philosopher of the twentieth century. 
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consumers are assigned, which is rarely correlated with consumption (Simshauser & Downer, 
2016).11   
 
To be sure, the practice of third-degree price discrimination is in stark contrast to the 
economist’s model of perfect competition where a single uniform price is efficiently set to 
marginal cost.  However, conditions required to achieve perfectly competitive markets are as 
common as perfect regulation (Varian, 1996; Joskow, 2010).  A long list of explicit and 
implicit assumptions underpin perfect competition, viz. constant returns to scale, no fixed, 
common or sunk costs, zero transaction costs, perfect information and perfectly elastic 
demand.  When these assumptions are progressively relaxed the stable uniform price 
equilibrium breaks down.   
 
Crucially, price discrimination is not unambiguously harmful to economic welfare – on the 
contrary – price discrimination in capital-intensive industries is frequently welfare enhancing 
(Schwartz, 1986; Varian, 1996, Dana, 1999b; Levine, 2002; Baumol & Swanson, 2003; 
Esteves, 2009; Elegido, 2011; Littlechild, 2014; Simshauser & Whish-Wilson, 2017).  In 
asymmetric markets with non-trivial fixed and sunk costs, banning the practice will usually 
dampen competition, facilitate collusive behaviour, harm price-sensitive consumers and leave 
customers overall no better-off (Vickers, 2009; Hviid & Waddams Price, 2012; Littlechild, 
2016; Waddams Price and Zhu, 2016).   
 
Ultimately, sunk costs need to be recovered in some way and average cost pricing of 
electricity is known to be inefficient and if pursued will produce deadweight losses by 
comparison to alternate methods (Hotelling, 1938; Lewis, 1941; Coase, 1946; Boiteux, 1949; 
Bonbright, 1961; Nelson, 1964; Turvey, 1968; Joskow, 1976).  Consequently whether from 
an economics or public policy perspective, price discrimination whereby non-trivial fixed and 
sunk costs are differentially recovered from strong (less-price sensitive) customer segments 
while allowing for marginal cost pricing in weak (more-price sensitive) segments is known to 
distribute the firm’s cost-recovery task more fairly and in this sense generally displays 
positive distributional efficiency effects because the former are usually high-income 
households (Varian, 1996; Dana, 1999a; Marcoux, 2006; Elegido, 2011; Simshauser & 
Whish-Wilson, 2017; Nelson et al 2018).   
2.2 Key variables  
Key to distinguishing whether price discrimination is welfare enhancing is to identify changes 
in aggregate market output, i.e. expansion of total output is a necessary condition for price 
discrimination to be welfare enhancing12 (Schmalensee, 1981; Varian, 1985; Schwartz, 1990).  
Total output will expand if output contraction in the strong (i.e. non-discounted) segment is at 
least offset by output expansions in the weak segment, with the clearest case of welfare 
enhancing discriminatory pricing being where new markets are supplied that would otherwise 
not be served under uniform prices (Varian, 1996).  
 
Corts (1998) demonstrated in an asymmetric oligopoly differential prices can fall below the 
uniform price when ornate tariff structures are used by firms to attack rivals and steal market 
share, which in turn can produce ‘all out competition’ – an outcome not possible with  
monopoly13.  Fundamental to understanding Corts (1998) is that profit and welfare outcomes 
are sensitive to whether rivals agree on strong and weak segments.  When they do, firms 
follow a best-response symmetry in pricing decisions, and prices fall below uniform prices in 
weak segments, and rise above uniform prices in strong segments with ambiguous welfare 
                                                          
11 The issue here is that while higher income households generally consume more energy than low income households, some of 
the highest consumers also happen to be low income (due to poor housing stock, unemployment, over-crowding and so on). 
12 To be sure, it is not a sufficient condition because other industry variables (e.g. excessive switching costs or excess entry in 
competitive markets) can overrun welfare gains generated by expanded output. 
13 In monopoly settings, firm profits can only increase with price discrimination because the firm is solving the profit 
maximisation problem with one less constraint, and would only chose this strategy if it were profitable (Armstrong, 2006b).  
Under such conditions prices disperse either side of average cost and consequently welfare impacts are ambiguous (Stole, 2007, 
Armstrong, 2008).  In a symmetric oligopoly where firms agree on strong and weak segments, price dispersion is similar to 
monopoly, viz. strong and weak segment prices lie either side of the uniform price, with some consumers worse-off, and others 
better-off cf. uniform prices (Holmes, 1989).  Whether total welfare is enhanced depends critically on expansion in output.  
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impacts – yielding results consistent with Katz (1984), Borenstein (1985), Thisse & Vives 
(1988), Holmes (1989), Winter (1997) and others.  However, when firms disagree on strong 
and weak segments, they display best-response asymmetry with competition intensifying.  
Under such conditions, price discrimination gives firms more weapons with which to ‘wage 
their war’ (Corts, 1998, p.321).  Consequently, and unlike monopoly, in imperfectly 
competitive markets the impact of price discrimination on both welfare and profit is 
ambiguous.  The number of relevant variables also expands considerably.  Of central 
importance is the symmetry of market information amongst rival firms.   
 
Essential to understanding the present policy problem is the corollary to the Corts (1998) 
analysis.  If asymmetric markets are forced back to uniform pricing due to policymaker 
intervention, rival firms will lose the weapons used to wages their war and naturally retreat to 
strong market segments to maximise profit (Waddams Price & Zhu, 2016; Littlechild, 2016).  
Under asymmetric conditions with less competitive pressure, subsequent pricing behaviour of 
the firms will resemble monopoly.   
 
Studies of price discrimination relevant to Full Retail Contestability spans the range of 
markets and structures. To summarise the results14 and as Stole (2007) explains, competition 
is usually effective at controlling average prices but is not always effective at generating the 
correct pattern of relative prices and represents a key source of ambiguity in the welfare 
analysis.  
 
Relevant to retail electricity markets from a theoretical perspective are observations from 
Armstrong (2006b), viz. when entry is relatively frictionless, price discrimination will 
produce a higher number of firms initially.  The welfare implications of excess entry are 
adverse (i.e. excessive industry fixed costs).  But proliferation of ornate tariff structures will 
drive inefficient firms out over time (Armstrong, 2008). 
  
Also of importance to retail electricity markets is empirical analysis of aviation markets by 
Borenstein & Rose (1994) and Dana (1998, 1999b) who examine nuances between monopoly 
and monopolistic competition, and show reliance on monopoly theories will misguide 
policymaking.  Perhaps counterintuitively, along with Stole (2007) they show price 
dispersion increases as competition intensifies (Klein, 1993; Borenstein & Rose, 1994; Dana, 
1999b; Levine, 2002; Baumol & Swanson, 2003; Stole 2007).15   
 
Electricity markets are characterised by customer poaching, franchise areas, customer loyalty, 
mixed product bundles (i.e electricity and gas), national vs. single region retailers, and 
behavioural-based poaching.  Various studies have analysed analogous scenarios and again to 
summarise results16, the fact that firms can be worse-off with price discrimination in 
imperfectly competitive markets is a fundamental difference with monopoly theory.  
Monopolists are always better-off when they price-discriminate.  Competitor firms are better 
off holding the behaviour of rivals constant.  But once this assumption is relaxed, if segment 
information is asymmetric they are likely to be worse-off.  A regulatory ban of price 
discrimination can facilitate tacit collusion but the key is whether firms agree on strong and 
weak market segments.   
                                                          
14 The range of markets and structured and associated modelling results are characterised by 1) number of rivals, 2) information 
availability, 3) size of customer segments, 4) ease of entry, 5) size of discounts, 6) customer poaching, 7) branding and loyalty, 
and 8) mixed product bundles (see Katz, 1984; Borenstien 1985, Holmes, 1989; Chen, 1997; Corts 1998; Dana, 1999a; Shaffer & 
Zhang, 2000, Taylor, 2003; Dobson & Waterson, 2005, Armstrong 2006a; Stole, 2007; Armstrong, 2008; Esteves, 2009 amongst 
others).  Additionally, in oligopolistic markets price discrimination can produce inefficient industry costs from ‘excess entry’, too 
many firms operating at sub-optimal scale, excessive customer switching and sub-optimal coordination of prices.  All of these 
variables impact welfare analysis.   
15 Borenstein & Rose (1994) also identify customer loyalty programs and advanced information systems increase price dispersion 
through higher prices in strong segments.  Conversely, they find when markets are dominated by weak segment consumers, price 
dispersion contracts. 
16 Bester & Petrakis (1996) examine customer poaching; Shaffer & Zhang (2000) extend the analysis to include franchise areas 
and customer loyalty; Matutes & Regibeau (1992) and Whinston (1990) examine mixed product bundles; Dobson & Waterson 
(2005) examine national retailers committing to uniform prices; Chen (1997) examines behavioural-based customer poaching; 
Taylor (2003) examines time and effort in a limited commitment model; Chen (2006) analyses limit pricing and Vickers (2005) 
examines banning discrimination as entry protection.  
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Market power is often assumed to be a precondition for price discrimination.  This is not 
correct in theory or practice; indeed one strand of the price discrimination literature focuses 
on intensely competitive markets (Klein, 1992; Levine, 2002; Baumol & Swanson 2003).  
Because fixed and sunk costs are pervasive, price discrimination is prevalent in highly 
competitive markets as well and occurs as the means to recover such costs in markets where 
no apparent market power exists (Levine, 2002; Littlechild, 2017).  Dana (1998) examines 
certain US airline routes in the context of a market characterised by peak demand uncertainty, 
non-storability, underutilised capacity and intensely competitive routes (i.e. absence of 
market power).  Dana (1999a) shows it is efficient for airlines to allocate different seats at 
different times and at different prices, and is not sufficient evidence that market power exists.  
Levine (2002) and Baumol & Swanson (2003) explain price discrimination is frequently how 
competitive firms recover costs in a way that mirrors Ramsey17 pricing, but instead of facing a 
regulated revenue constraint the broader market imposes a proximate revenue constraint on 
firms.  Above all, as Varian (1996) explains, price discrimination is a means by which to 
increase quantities sold, not to withhold capacity – which is the necessary condition for the 
exercise of market power.   
2.3 Price discrimination in residential electricity markets  
In Great Britain and Victoria, regulatory authorities and policymakers have reacted adversely 
to price discrimination amongst the residential segment, noting price differentials could not be 
explained by estimates of variations in cost (Ofgem, 2008, 2011; Ben-David, 2013; ACCC, 
2017; Thwaites et al 2017).   
 
In the British case, Ofgem (2008, 2011) observed the “Big 6” incumbent retailers offering 
deep discounts in rival service areas while maintaining higher Standing Offer tariffs in their 
own former franchise area.  This describes the conventional two-period customer poaching 
model under best-response asymmetry (Armstrong, 2006a). As Hviid & Waddams Price 
(2012) and Littlechild (2014) explain, Ofgem set out to eliminate price differentials by 
regulatory policy on the basis that differentials were unfair and reflected the exercise of 
market power.  But the regulator had misinterpreted the market; as Borenstein & Rose (1994), 
Dana (1998, 1999a, 1999b), Armstrong (2006b), Stole (2007) and others explain, rising price 
dispersion can be expected as competition intensifies, not the other way around.  And as Klein 
(1993) and Levine (2002) warn, price discrimination should not be misdiagnosed as a side-
effect of market power.  New products and tariffs are how firms attract and ‘poach’ a rival’s 
idle customer segments and is not evidence of market power or market failure (Baumol & 
Swanson, 2003; Littlechild, 2014).   
 
The regulatory policy imposed by Ofgem was a retail licence condition of common mark-ups 
across regions to halt discriminatory mixed bundling and behavioural-based customer 
poaching in an asymmetric Corts (1998) market.  Drawing from Katz (1984), Thisse & Vives 
(1988) and Corts (1998), theory predicts that firms will retreat to strong markets when 
discriminatory practices are banned.  And as Hviid & Waddams Price (2012), Pollitt & Haney 
(2014), Littlechild (2014) and Waddams Price & Zhu (2016) explain, British energy retailers 
did retreat to their strong markets, removed competitive tariffs, competition declined, 
discounts contracted, switching rates fell as gains from switching diminished, customer 
poaching slowed, overall tariff mark-ups began to rise and energy retailer profits increased 
materially (up £1 billion pa).   
 
In Australia, a steady line of inquiry on discriminatory prices has emerged in Victoria (Ben-
David 2013; Dufty & Johnson, 2014; CME, 2015; Grattan, 2017) culminating in the Thwaites 
and ACCC Reviews.  The Thwaites Review argued households were paying 21% higher than 
official estimates and average bills were $500 more than the lowest Market Offer (albeit 
based on a sample of 682 consumer accounts).  The Review found retailer charges had risen 
                                                          
17 Ramsey pricing was designed to be deployed in regulated monopoly industries as a means by which to recover common fixed 
and sunk costs in a least distortionary way, i.e. setting a high price in the relevant strong market and low price in weak markets – 
essentially combining an inverse-elasticity rule with multi-part tariffs to recover infra-marginal costs for a given regulated 
revenue constraint.  Ramsey pricing has long been regarded as a benign form of discriminatory pricing and preferable to uniform 
prices in declining cost monopoly industries.  See Ramsey (1927). 
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sharply, and Australia’s “Big 3 Gentailers” dominated the market with their significant low-
cost advantage but failed to translate these into lower prices. The market was judged to be 
confusing; discounts were not pegged to a common reference rate and two-part tariffs (i.e. 
fixed charge and variable rate) meant some discounts only applied to the variable rate.18  
 
Analysing the same market, Simshauser & Whish-Wilson (2017) contrasted the fully 
deregulated Victorian market with the (then) semi-deregulated Southeast Queensland market 
which retained a regulated price cap and found that (1) price dispersion was more pronounced 
in Victoria; (2) the marginal Market Offer had zero profit margin (cf semi-deregulated 
Southeast Queensland with 6.7% profit mark-ups) while (3) Standing Offers were 10% above 
average cost.  Littlechild (2017, p.8) explains how this occurs: 
 
In some circumstances, firms have no choice: the pressure of competition can force 
them to discriminate, simply to survive (Baumol, 2006). The retail energy market 
appears to be such a case.  Retail suppliers are driven by competition to reduce 
prices to the most active customers (to try and keep those customers most prepared to 
leave, and to try to attract replacement customers from other suppliers).  These prices 
are driven down towards operating cost.  So suppliers have to try and recover their 
overhead costs from their less active customers.  But all their tariffs are subject to 
competition because all customers can switch. 
 
Importantly, a majority of Victorian households were better-off than a counterfactual 
regulated uniform price even though Standing Offers were 10% above average cost.  Only 
11% of households had not shifted to Market Contracts.  However, analysis of a Big 3 
retailer’s private data found 4.9% of customers were on a Standing Offer (strong segment) 
and were vulnerable (weak segment) and had thus been misallocated by the market (i.e. inter-
consumer misallocation).  Consistent with Stole (2007), the Victorian market had been 
successful at regulating the average price but had not generated the correct pattern of relative 
prices for about 100,000 vulnerable households (out of 2.4 million households). 
 
Nelson et al. (2018) extended the Victorian analysis by focusing on non-vulnerable Standing 
Offer customers in Victoria and found they consumed 18% less than households on 
discounted products.  The analysis was consistent with the premise of perceived gains from 
switching (Flores & Waddams Price, 2013, IPART, 2013; Simshauser, 2014; Littlechild, 
2014; He & Reiner, 2017).  That is, households may maximise welfare by remaining 
disengaged and on a higher-priced Standing Offer.  That such customers exist does not 
represent a market failure – from a practical perspective they spend 1.6% of household 
income on electricity19 and simply put, their time is better spent elsewhere.  
 
3. Analysis of the Southeast Queensland Retail Electricity Market 
The Queensland market makes for a fascinating case study because unlike other jurisdictions, 
it comprises common input costs with two retail zones, a fully deregulated zone and a 
regulated monopoly supply zone: 
 
• Southeast Queensland (1.3 million customers) is a fully contestable, highly 
competitive and deregulated retail electricity market with a single network service 
area, two incumbent retailers and 18 new entrants; and  
 
                                                          
18 The Review further found consumers needed to remain engaged and switch regularly to ensure they remained on competitive 
tariffs and consumers experience a significant loss of benefit whenever they cannot identify the single best offer in the market. 
Status quo bias was argued to create a sticky consumer problem.  The Review concluded “these elements point to the fact that the 
market is failing consumers” and that strong intervention is required, including a regulated Basic Service Offer product with an 
unconditional obligation to supply (Thwaites et al, 2017 p.x).  Other recommendations included a change from un-anchored 
percent discount to absolute dollars savings with the independent regulator to develop 3-4 standard customer reference points, 
and a requirement to roll contracted customers onto the nearest matching offer at the end of any contract period to avoid an 
automated reversion to Standing Offer tariffs.  
19 Household expenditure data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics reveals that the average households spend 2% of income 
on electricity.  18% less implies 1.6%. 
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• Regional Queensland (640,000 customers) has a monopoly distributor-retailer with a 
regulated uniform tariff based on the Southeast Queensland economic cost of supply 
as its Benchmark tariff.    
 
These circumstances enable direct comparison of two residential electricity retail market 
extremes with Regional Queensland effectively comprising a 640,000 customer control 
group.  Figure 1 provides a map of Queensland and highlights the deregulated Southeast 
“Energex” distribution service area, the monopoly Regional “Ergon” distribution service area 
and whole of Queensland data (which also includes transmission connected industrial loads).   
Figure 1: Energex (SEQld) and Ergon (Regional Qld) distribution network service areas  
 
 
Note that because Queensland is a single wholesale region of the NEM, wholesale and retail 
costs are identical.  To be clear, the underlying Transmission and Distribution network 
charges (and losses) are materially higher in Regional Queensland but the method of charging 
is based on the actual costs in the Southeast due to a long-standing Uniform Tariff Policy (i.e. 
Regional Queensland customers pay the same network tariff as Southeast Queensland 
customers with losses funded by a State Government subsidy20).   
  
Queensland implemented a policy of Full Retail Contestability policy for the (non-subsidised) 
Southeast Corner in 2007 and a regulated price-cap was retained as a transitional measure.  
The Australian Energy Market Commission examined Southeast Queensland in 2014 and 
concluded it was “workably competitive” and that transitional price-caps were no longer 
necessary.  On the contrary, there had been episodes of erroneous regulatory price-cap 
decisions that damaged retail market performance (see Section 3.4).  In 2014 the (then) 
conservative state government announced it would deregulate Southeast Queensland from 
2015.  A general election produced a change of government, but the new Labor Cabinet 
nonetheless committed to deregulation, albeit after a one year delay in 2016.   
 
Less than 12 months after deregulation in Southeast Queensland, a politically-motivated 
inquiry into Australian retail electricity markets was launched by the Commonwealth 
                                                          
20 By way of brief background, Regional Queensland is a regulated monopoly supply service area due to Queensland’s long-
standing Uniform Tariff Policy.  This bipartisan political policy has been in existence since the early-1970s and serves to ensure 
Regional Queensland residential consumers pay no more for electricity than their Southeast Queensland city counterparts.  As 
Figure 1 notes, Energex (Southeast Queensland) has a Regulatory Asset Base of $12bn and serves 1,318,000 residential 
connections, while Ergon (Regional Queensland) has an $11bn Regulatory Asset Base with only 640,000 residential 
connections.  Network charges in Ergon’s service area are therefore materially higher.  The cost of the Uniform Tariff Policy is 
typically $300-$500m per annum and is funded by a State Government subsidy to the (state-owned) monopoly distributor-
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Government.  The “Retail Electricity Pricing Inquiry” was undertaken by Australia’s anti-
trust commission, the ACCC (2017, pp.99-100) which along with other regions took-aim at 
Southeast Queensland retailers:  
 
“…inactive customers who stay on a Standing Offer [in Southeast Queensland] may 
be paying up to $517 more than the regulated rate, and more than $700 more than 
the cheapest market offer.  These are substantial differences in price outcomes for 
what is a largely homogeneous service…”   
 
Such a quote21 could be expected, and did, make headlines in State-wide newspapers.22 
3.1 Defining the problem: price discrimination or price rises? 
Why is the residential electricity sector singled out for special attention when price 
discrimination is pervasive throughout the economy?  The Commercial & Industrial consumer 
segment of electricity markets exhibits extensive second- and third-degree practices, and 
while the level of prices receives constant attention, the practice of price discrimination is not 
questioned by policymakers. There are three reasons: 
 
1. Households access to electricity is a basic human right (Tully, 2006), and residential 
electricity supply has a 100+ year history of uniform tariffs;   
2. Households are voters, whereas Commercial & Industrial customers are not; 
3. Soon after deregulation the underlying cost of electricity increased sharply in Great 
Britain (Littlechild, 2017) and the NEM (Simshauser, 2014).   
 
In the British experience, energy cost increases were driven by international energy prices (i.e 
oil and gas) which led to marked Year-on-Year changes from 2005 (Littlechild, 2016, 
2017).  Policymakers and regulators had a distinct change in attitude towards the performance 
of the deregulated British retail market from 2008 (see Waddams Price & Zhu, 2016; 
Littlechild, 2016; He & Reiner, 2017).  Australia’s electricity price rises were not 
synchronised with Great Britain.  They became marked four years later from 2009 as Figure 2 
reveals.  The lead-time for the change in attitude towards retail market performance was 
synchronised – about 3-4 years after non-trivial price increases (see Ben-David, 2013; Dufty 
& Johson, 2014; CME, 2015; ACCC, 2017; Thwaites et al. 2017).   
3.2 Electricity price increases  
To understand the evolution of non-trivial price increases in Australia, Figure 2 presents 
average retail tariffs for Queensland from 1955-2018 in nominal and real terms.  
                                                          
21 In an apparent regulatory echo-chamber, the same conclusion was made of the British market by the CMA (2016, p.9) a year 
earlier:  …there is a wide variation in the prices that different domestic customers pay for energy, which is particularly striking 
since electricity and gas are entirely homogenous products... for some categories of customer, the average gains from switching 
were equivalent to more than 20% of their bill… 
22 Ironically, the ACCC (2017, p124) cited Australia’s jurisdictional regulator with the least experience in competitive retail 
electricity markets in Australia, the ICRC from the Australian Capital Territory, who suggested “price dispersion may only be 
reflecting information asymmetry and search costs” – implying that stamping out the practice will somehow enhance welfare. 
Economic theory and British market experience (Section 2) is very clear about this; price dispersion rises with competitive 
intensity.  Market offers and ornate tariff structures proliferate and are merely weapons used against rivals.  Efforts to stamp-out 
the practice will damage consumer welfare and increase the profits of firms (Hviid & Waddams Price, 2012; Flores & Waddams 
Price, 2013; Pollitt & Haney, 2014; Littlechild, 2016, 2017; Waddams Price and Zhu, 2016). 
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Figure 2: Queensland average residential tariff 1955-2018 – “uniform/regulated rate”23 
 
Source:  esaa, QCA, ABS, Simshauser & Downer (2016). 
 
It took 45 years of technological advancement, scale economies and microeconomic reform 
from 1962-2007 to drive real tariffs from 30c/kWh down to 16c/kWh.  Policy error, and fuel 
prices linking to export markets would unwind those gains in seven years (2007-2014).  For 
households, tariff increases were material and sustained.  Each jurisdiction of Australia’s 
NEM experienced some variation to the Figure 2 data but the general trend was 
consistent.  Three distinct drivers were responsible for material tariff increases from 2007, 
viz. network policy failure (2007-2013), environmental schemes (2011-2017) and wholesale 
prices24 (2015-2018):    
 
1. In relation to network policy failure, in the 2004 summer Southeast Queensland 
experienced a series of extreme weather events which produced three severe episodes 
of distribution network-related load-shedding.  These were a political disaster because 
Energex, a government-owned distribution network company, had aggressively 
reduced operating and capital expenditures in prior periods to raise productivity and 
returns (as requested by Shareholding Departments).  An inquiry into the blackouts 
recommended a change in planning standards, from stochastic to deterministic, which 
produced a form of Averch & Johnson (1962) gold-plating.  The huge expansion in 
the capital base commenced soon after, with network tariffs more than doubling from 
2007-2013 (Simshauser, 2014b). 
 
2. Four environmental schemes impacted tariffs from 2011-2017.  To be clear, each 
scheme had a modest impact but combined they aggravated network-driven tariff 
increases.  Schemes included i). solar Feed-in Tariff (Nelson et al 2012; Simshauser, 
2016); 20% Renewable Energy Target which was separated into two, viz. ii). small-
scale and iii). utility scale (Jones 2009; MacGill 2010; Buckman and Diesendorf 
2010; Nelson et al. 2013) and iv). the carbon tax from 2012-2014 (Freebairn, 2014; 
Wild et al. 2015).  At their peak, environmental schemes added 15% to an already 
sharply rising tariff (Simshauser & Downer, 2016). 
 
3. As Great Britain experienced a decade earlier, wholesale prices in the NEM doubled 
(in some regions, tripled) from 2015-2017.  A supply-side crisis occurred following 
the closure of 18% of the coal-fired fleet (Simshauser & Tiernan, 2018).  Decades of 
climate change policy discontinuity had taken a toll on supply-side additions in prior 
                                                          
23 As one reviewer noted, technically a second rate should appear from 2016 – the weighted average of the two incumbent 
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periods, and consequently coal plant exit was not matched by adequate entry coupled 
with acute problems in the market for natural gas (Simshauser & Nelson, 2015). 
 
These pricing effects were sequential and cumulative.  Compounding matters, the run-up in 
electricity prices occurred in the post-Global Financial Crisis era of low general inflation, low 
wages growth and in some jurisdictions coincident record-high housing costs.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, as with Great Britain, electricity prices and retail electricity markets became a 
cost of living focus event for politicians (see Littlechild, 2014; Waddams Price & Zhu, 2016; 
Simshauser, 2016; He & Reiner, 2017; Nelson et al. 2018; Simshauser & Tiernan, 2018).   
3.3 Tariff structure: regulated Default Tariff vs. unregulated Standing Offers 
Queensland’s Uniform Tariff Policy means the State’s independent economic regulator must 
make an annual assessment of the economic cost of electricity supply for the Southeast 
Queensland residential segment, and apply this regulated tariff to Regional Queensland 
residential customers.  Consequently, unlike all other regions in the NEM, Queensland has an 
independent Benchmark.  To be clear, the regulator’s tariff setting methodology is not 
unanimously supported (Simshauser, 2014) but it is nonetheless transparent and consistently 
applied.  The tariff determination for 2017/18 is presented in Figure 3 along with comparisons 
to deregulated Standing Offers and the best available Market Offer.  
Figure 3: Qld Tariff build-up, Regulated Rate vs Standing Offers and Best Market Offer 
 
Source:  QCA, AGL Energy, Origin Energy, Alinta Energy. 
 
The first bar in Figure 3 illustrates the cost-components of the regulated tariff applied to the 
640,000 residential customers in Regional Queensland – and to be clear – is based on the 
estimated economic cost of supply to a consumer in Southeast Queensland. The 2nd bar shows 
the Benchmark structure, viz. a two-part tariff with the fixed charge comprising roughly 
20%.  Apart from the general residential consumption tariff (Tariff 11), large numbers of 
Queensland households also access discounted (load controlled) hot water//pool pump tariffs, 
known as Tariffs 31 and 33.  Data in Figures 2-3 represent a blended average of two tariffs in 
proportion to their general use.25  Next are Standing Offers of incumbent retailers, AGL 
Energy (352,000 customers) and Origin Energy (630,000 customers).  Finally is the deepest 
‘routine discount’ Market Offer from 2nd Tier retailer Alinta Energy (53,600 customers).    
3.4 Competitive health of the Southeast Queensland retail market 
Customer switching is frequently used as a headline measure of the health of contestable 
residential electricity markets.  Switching rates in Southeast Queensland and NEM regions 
                                                          
25 In this instance, 5000kWh on Tariff 11, and 1250kWh on Tariff 33.  Tariff 31 is an alternative to Tariff 33 – it has a lower 
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have typically averaged 16-22% per annum.  This compares favourably to the British 
residential energy market (11-13%) following earlier damage done by Ofgem (Littlechild, 
2016; He & Reiner, 2017).  It is helpful to place Southeast Queensland customer switching 
rates in context by contrasting other industry rates (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Industry comparison of customer switching rates  
 
Sources: Simshauser (2014), AEMO. 
 
Detailed historic data for Southeast Queensland and the other primary26 NEM regions is 
presented in Table 2.  Note the run-up in Southeast Queensland customer switching from the 
2016/17 Financial Year, the first year following price deregulation. 
 
Table 2: Customer switching by NEM Region (2007/08-2017/1827) 
 
Source:  AEMO, AGL Energy. 
 
Figure 4 presents Year-on-Year customer switching velocity for Southeast Queensland 
(monthly resolution) for the seven-year period prior to price deregulation (2009-2016), and 
two-year period following deregulation (2016-2018), annotated with key regulatory events.  
Note during the regulated pricing period there are two sharp declines in Year-on-Year 
customer switching.  In both instances, the regulated tariff cap was set at levels below market 
expectation with an effect of compressing price dispersion (Simshauser, 2014).  In 
contemplating the impact on the NEM, Yarrow (2008, p15, p21) explains the consequence of 
such policy: 
 
...price regulation in competitive market situations generally harms economic 
efficiency... It can be said that regulators, no matter how wise and no matter how well 
resourced, could be expected to make significant mistakes – because the problem has 
to do with information.  The determination of a competitive price is a process that 
makes use of huge amounts of information, of such scale and scope as cannot feasibly 
be processed by a single decision-making unit such as a regulatory agency... 
 
                                                          
26 There are two other regions of the NEM, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Tasmania.  Neither have truly competitive 
markets due to excess-regulation.   
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Fin Year SE QLD VIC NSW SA
2007/08 20.3 22.4 10.2 18.3
2008/09 20.7 25.4 10.9 15.0
2009/10 23.3 25.9 12.8 13.9
2010/11 25.3 27.1 14.0 18.6
2011/12 21.2 26.8 17.3 22.1
2012/13 18.1 28.7 20.1 22.0
2013/14 17.0 27.3 15.2 18.3
2014/15 16.7 26.6 15.9 16.0
2015/16 16.8 24.6 16.9 16.3
2016/17 22.1 27.4 18.6 16.5
2017/18 30.4 29.0 20.7 19.1
5Yr Avg 20.6 27.0 17.5 17.3
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Figure 4: Customer switching velocity in Southeast Queensland (2009-2017) 
 
Source:  Simshauser (2014), AEMO, AER. 
 
Regulatory determinations and policy decisions impact the number of rivals in competitive 
markets, both positively and negatively, and in turn the depth of discounting, consumer gains 
and market activity.  The first adverse regulatory determination in 2009 was relatively short 
lived as Figure 4 indicates – incumbent retailers appealed the erroneous determination and the 
tariff was swiftly reset by court order, and switching rates rebounded.  However, soon after 
the independent regulator fundamentally altered their tariff determination methodology when 
the market was oversupplied.  The policy methodology was seen as opportunistic, and as 
Kydland & Prescott’s (1977) theory on dynamic inconsistency would suggest, resulted in the 
exit of retailers and soon after switching rates contracted as Table 3 and Figure 4 illustrate.  
Conversely, the announcement of price deregulation in late-2014, and its implementation 
from July 2016 has seen the number of rival retailers expand from 12 to 20. 
 
Table 3: Retailers in the Southeast Queensland market 
 
Source: QCA, AER. 
 
Another residential market metric that requires monitoring by policymakers is so-called 
“rusted-on” customer numbers, i.e. customers who have never switched and remain rusted-
on to incumbent retailer Standing Offer tariffs.  Hviid & Waddams Price (2014) explain 
consumers do not always respond immediately to better deals and thus one should not expect 
full market turnover.  He & Reiner (2017, p.27) note that according to some, rusted-on 
customers are evidence of market power and barriers to competition, which has disadvantaged 
certain groups.  But they also note by contrast Littlechild’s (2016b, p.635) observation that 
these ‘sleeper customers’ may be ‘annoyed rather than grateful to be disturbed’.  Recall from 
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YoY Chg in 
Switching (%)
2007/08 8 0 0.0
2008/09 9 +1 -5.6
2009/10 10 +1 26.1
2010/11 8 -2 10.0
2011/12 10 +2 -15.2
2012/13 11 +1 -13.8
2013/14 13 +2 -5.5
2014/15 12 -1 -0.8
2015/16 14 +2 1.9
2016/17 16 +2 33.1
2017/18* 20 +4 48.9
*Annualised
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Offer customers were 18% lower than Market Offer customers.  Table 4 presents rusted-on 
customer results for Southeast Queensland and the other primary NEM regions: 
 
Table 4: Year of reform and market customers vs. “rusted-on” customers 
 
Source: AEMC, AEC, AEMO, AGL Energy, Origin Energy. 
 
Table 4 notes Victoria is the oldest of the deregulated markets (2009) with the lowest number 
of rusted-on customers (10%).  After deregulating in 2016, 17% of Southeast Queensland 
customers are rusted-on.  These results compare favourably to the British Market, which has 
about 33% of rusted-on customers after Full Retail Contestability in 1999 and price 
deregulation in 2002 (Littlechild, 2016; He & Reiner, 2017).   
 
The evolution of customers leaving the Default Tariff in Southeast Queensland and the Year-
on-Year change is illustrated in Figure 5.  Notice the slowing of customers leaving the 
Default following the regulatory changes in 2010/11, and the pickup in Market Contracts 
once deregulation had been telegraphed to the market from late-2014. 
Figure 5: Share of customers now on a market contract 
 
Source: QCA, AER. 
 
Comparing Southeast Queensland customer switching against other markets (Table 1), 
adjacent regions (Table 2), historical results (Figure 4), the number of active retailers (Table 
3) and customer movements from Standing Offers (Table 4, Figure 5) does not reveal any 
non-price cause for alarm.   
 
The final matter of interest is the extent of price dispersion.  With the number of retailers in 
the market expanding from 12 to 20 following two years of deregulation, the number of 
Standing Offers and best routine discounts has expanded to 40 (with 128 individual products 
given different metering arrangements, product mixes and rival retailers) and the dispersion of 
tariffs has increased in line with general findings in the literature.  In Figure 6, “2015 Pre-
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Wilson (2017) and inflated to 2018 dollars, while 2018 data has been drawn from prevailing 
Standing & routine discounted Market Offers. 
Figure 6:  Tariff dispersion: pre- and post-deregulation tariffs vs Benchmark 
 
 
Source: AER & Energy Retailer Websites (for 2018 offers), Simshauser & Whish-Wilson (2017) (for 2015 offers). 
 
The spread of Offers either side of Benchmark is now approximately +15/-17%.  Table 5 
summarises headline results from a consumer perspective. Click Energy’s Standing Offer 
customers would theoretically pay $277 more than Benchmark.  Of course, as a 2nd Tier 
retailer Click Energy has no “rusted-on” customers, and only 200 new customers yet to sign 
any retail offer with any retailer, and so have defaulted to Click Energy’s Standing Offer tariff 
(such customers are known as “Occupier” or “Dear Customer” accounts28).   
 
Click Energy started with a zero customer base, all customers have been poached from rivals 
and Click’s discounted Market Offer contract is currently set to 22% off Standing Offer rates 
(about $50 below Benchmark).  However, what this analysis does not capture is Click 
Energy’s Solar PV Feed-in Tariff, viz. 16c/kWh – 60% higher than the regulatory Benchmark 
of 10c/kWh.  From this we may deduce Click’s strategy is focused on accumulating solar PV 
customers.   
 
The lowest Standing Offer comes from PeopleEnergy, which is 5.1% below Benchmark.  For 
the so-called rusted-on customers with incumbent retailers Origin Energy and AGL Energy, 
Standing Offer tariffs are 2.1% ($40) and 4.1% ($82) above Benchmark, respectively.  Table 
5 also presents the four most competitive “routine” discounted products.  What this table does 
not reveal is non-routine discounts, viz. those offered prior to switching away from a retailer.  
These will typically come close to, or match, the prevailing market leader.  
 
                                                          
28 Occupier or Dear Customer accounts arise from a change of occupancy of a premises. That is, when a new home occupier 
arrives and the electricity remains connected, the customer defaults to the previous owner’s retailer.  At this point they 
commence on a Standing Offer until they make themselves known to the prevailing retailer.  Such customers are also dominant 
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Table 5: Standing & Market Offers vs. Regulated Benchmark for a 6250kWh consumer 
 
Source:  AER, Energy Retailer Websites 
3.5 Quantitative analysis of Southeast Queensland customer market data 
Australian energy retailers have historically treated their customer numbers as highly 
confidential.  During the course of this research, Southeast Queensland retailers agreed to 
provide total residential account numbers and Standing Offer tariff customer numbers to the 
author.  These data, along with Standing Offers and Routine Discounts, are presented in Table 
6.   
 
Table 6: Retailers, Customer Numbers, Standing Offer & Routine Discount (as at Qtr2 2017/18) 
 
Source:  Energy Retailers, Australian Energy Regulator (EnergyMadeEasy). **No response, estimated numbers. 
 
Combining data from Table 6 and Figure 6 enables a view of price dispersion by customer 
numbers, in Figure. 7. In doing so, Market Customers have been allocated to routine 
discounts in Table 6. In practice, some customers will be on older products (with lower 
discounts) whereas other customers will have obtained higher discounts offered privately 
through "save and intervention activities" that arise from conventional poaching activity. 
Furthermore, discounts stepped-up materially during the period of producing this article (viz. 
both Alinta & AGL both increased their discount offers to 27%) and this has not been 
captured in the following analysis (thus counterbalancing likely effects of "older products"). 
 
While there are technically 18 Offers exceeding Benchmark at 6250kWh/a, the actual number 
of customer above Benchmark is low.  The ACCC (2017) flagged the highest cost tariff in 
their most recent report to media and policymakers; what they did not reveal is how few 




















Benchmark (Regulated Tariff) 87.1 25.9 20.5 n/a $1,869 $0 -
Standing Offers
 - Highest (Click Energy) 120.0 27.7 25.8 n/a $2,146 $277 14.8
 - Lowest (People Energy) 116.4 22.2 18.9 n/a $1,773 -$96 -5.1
 - Incumbent (AGL Energy) 103.0 26.0 22.0 n/a $1,951 $82 4.4
 - Incumbent (Origin Energy) 117.0 24.5 20.5 n/a $1,908 $40 2.1
Market Offers
 - Lowest (Alinta) 101.8 26.0 22.0 25% off Variable Rates 1552.6 -$316 -16.9
 - 2nd Lowest (Qenergy) 120.0 30.6 28.6 17% off Bill $1,593 -$275 -14.7
 - 3rd Lowest (Red Energy) 102.7 23.3 20.9 10% off Bill $1,620 -$248 -13.3
 - 4th Lowest (Dodo Power & Gas) 121.9 26.3 22.3 25% off Variable Rates $1,638 -$231 -12.3
Fixed Rate T11 Variable RateT33 Variable Rate
(c/kWh) (c/kWh) (c/kWh)
1st Energy 500          20                  480         117.5 28.0 24.7 18% Off Variable Rates
AGL Energy 352,000    64,300            287,700   103.0 26.0 22.0 15% Off Variable Rates
Alinta Energy 53,616      161                53,455     101.8 26.0 22.0 25% Off Variable Rates
Amaysim 0             0                   0             120.0 27.7 25.8 15% Off Variable Rates
Click Energy 60,000      200                59,800     120.0 27.7 25.8 22% Off Total Bill
Diamond Energy** 7,500       200                7,300       127.6 26.5 22.5 10% Off Total Bill
Dodo Power & Gas 15,000      0                   15,000     121.9 26.3 22.3 25% Off Variable Rates
Energy Australia 107,681    2,239             105,442   117.0 26.6 21.1 20% Off Variable Rates
Energy Locals 1,800       0                   1,800       112.0 25.0 23.0 8% Off Total Bill
Lumo Energy -          -                -          102.7 25.1 20.9 10% Off Total Bill
Mojo Power 1,200       200                1,000       179.1 22.6 17.4
Momentum 17            7                   10           87.1 25.9 20.5
Origin Energy 630,000    157,000          473,000   117.0 24.5 20.5 16% Off Variable Rates
PeopleEnergy 0             0                   0             116.4 22.2 18.9
Powerdirect 9,587       505                9,082       104.2 27.4 25.1 14% Off Variable Rates
Powershop 6,181       0                   6,181       104.2 26.8 25.1 16% Off Total Bill
Qenergy 1,751       475                1,276       120.0 30.6 28.6 17% Off Total Bill
Red Energy 55,171      588                54,583     102.7 23.3 20.9 10% Off Total Bill
Sanctuary Energy 1,550       100                1,450       131.1 24.5 20.8
Simply Energy 14,403      23                  14,380     89.9 28.0 25.4 20% Off Variable Rates
TOTAL SEQ 1,317,957 226,018          1,091,939 
Ergon Energy 640,000    640,000          0             87.1 25.9 20.5
TOTAL QLD 1,957,957 866,018          1,091,939 
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Figure 7: Tariff dispersion by customer accounts vs Benchmark 
 
 
Combining market volumes with customer tariff data from Table 6 and Figure 7 enables a 
comparison of the regulated Regional Queensland market with the deregulated Southeast 
Queensland market.  This analysis is presented in Table 7.   
 
Table 7: Analysis of Regulated Regional vs. Deregulated Southeast Queensland 
 
 
Key results in Table 7 are lines 6 and 10 – the aggregate consumer welfare Gain from price 
deregulation is $184.0 million, and aggregate customers numbers below Benchmark is 
1,037,104 households.  In other words, the market has been successful at regulating overall 
average prices.  Furthermore, a majority of households (i.e. 78.7%) have benefited 
significantly from price deregulation, and consumers overall are better off.   
 
4. The modes of failure in deregulated retail electricity markets  
The analysis and headlines produced by the ACCC (2017, pp98-100), which highlighted a 
$700 difference between lowest and highest offers, implied something was entirely amiss in 
Southeast Queensland (i.e. with such a large discrepancy in price).  They did not highlight 
just how few customers were actually on the outlier Standing Offer (and the fact that such 
customers were simply Occupier Accounts (per Section  3.4).  The evidence contained in 
Section 3 indicates a well-functioning residential electricity market.  This is not to suggest the 
market is free of failures.  Certain issues such as confusion over offers and the misallocation 
of customers identified in Thwaites et al (2017) vis-à-vis the deregulated Victorian market, 
and by the ACCC (2017), are serious policy problems that require ongoing policy adjustment, 













Regional Qld Southeast Qld Total Qld
1 Tariff Status Regulated Deregulated Mixed
2 Customers 640,000       1,317,957      1,957,957     
3 Energy GWh 4,000,000    8,237,232      12,237,232    
4 Energy Bills ($ '000) 1,195,879    2,278,620      3,474,498     
5 Benchmark ($ '000) 1,195,879    2,462,682      3,658,561     
6 Gain ($ '000) -               184,063        184,063        
7 Unit Price (c/kWh) 29.90          27.66            28.39           
8 Average Discount (%) -             7.5% 5.0%
9 Customers Above Benchmark 0 227,398        227,398        
10 Customers Below Benchmark 0 1,037,104      1,037,104     
11 Customers At Benchmark 640,000       53,455          693,455        
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It is worth sifting through key market variables in order to distinguish genuine from perceived 
problems, and in turn, guide policymakers and Official Advisors towards dealing with 
legitimate modes of failure, and conversely, avoiding the catastrophic errors of Ofgem, viz. 
misdiagnosing functioning market characteristics as problems and designing policy to fix it, 
and in the process doing more harm than good. 
4.1 Jawboning: the role of the Department of Energy 
In Australia’s NEM, energy market policy advice is a congested space.29  With a strange twist 
of irony as the electricity industry was reformed, utilities privatised and industry dynamics 
and general market complexity increased, the size and capacity of the average jurisdictional 
Department of Energy diminished and functions were abandoned – especially as markets 
were deregulated.  Queensland’s Department was subjected to these same trends over two 
decades, however, two functional areas remained sharply focused and well-resourced with 
highly capable teams: (1) Retail Markets & Consumer Pricing, and (2) Wholesale Markets, 
along with a data analytics team providing requisite quantitative support. 
 
This energy policy and analytical base provided a basis for Official Advice to government, 
but crucially, would also form the foundation of industry jawboning.  Relying on the basic 
principles in Stigler & Friedland (1962) – viz. that utilities fear the risk of re-regulation more 
than regulation itself – the Director-General and Deputy Director-General of the Queensland 
Department of Energy would routinely “call in” each incumbent retailer (separately for anti-
trust reasons) prior to the start of each financial year, and specifically, prior to each tariff 
change announcement.  Pre-armed with the “house view” generated by Departmental teams 
and triangulated with the Regional Queensland regulated Benchmark, these “in-confidence” 
(i.e. behind closed doors) jawboning sessions ensured the Department could confidently 
explain to Government Ministers the precise basis of an incumbent retailer’s Standing Offer 
tariff change (i.e. Year-on-Year % change); and if not, provide the incumbent retailer with 
sufficient time to go away and “think carefully and purposefully” and if necessary, moderate 
planned increases.   
 
In jawboning, the judgement of Official Advisors was also continually on trial – as a form of 
soft policy it worked only if Executive Government upheld an implicit bargain; viz. avoiding 
episodes of energy retailers being pilloried by Government Ministers in the media following 
announcement of their Standing Offer increase.  In my professional experience30 when 1) was 
satisfied, Government Ministers proved very adept at explaining the basis of any tariff 
increase, minimising the adverse media and politics of Standing Offer changes, and in the 
process, i.e. energy retailers were not pilloried in the media by the Energy Minister.31 
 
Because industry participants understood the intended outcome of jawboning was ultimately a 
healthy marketplace with minimal distortionary and random political interventions, market 
participants seemed to appreciate and respond to timely insights provided by Official 
Advisors on Government thinking and the policy lens through which Government Ministers 
may view market performance.32   
                                                          
29 NEM rulemaking is undertaken by the Australian Energy Market Commission, system operations is undertaken by the 
Australian Energy Market Operator, NEM regulatory enforcement is undertaken by the Australian Energy Regulator, state-based 
matters are frequently delegated to jurisdictional economic regulatory authorities (e.g. Queensland Competition Authority, 
Victorian Essential Services Commission) and Energy Ministers have political advisors along with their Energy Departments.   
30 The author was Director-General of the Department of Energy & Water Supply from mid-2015 to late-2017.  Mr Benn Barr 
was Deputy Director-General (Energy).   
31 For examples of how tariff increases were handled in the media by the Qld Energy Minister see 
https://southburnett.com.au/news2/2016/05/31/electricity-price-rise-worse-than-forecast/, 
https://www.queenslandcountrylife.com.au/story/3998354/lng-pushing-up-electricity-prices-bailey/ 
https://www.sbs.com.au/news/blame-game-erupts-over-qld-power-prices and  
https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/government-steps-in-to-reverse-decision-on-power-price-hike-20170531-
gwh0vs.html.  In all instances, the Minister focuses on industry fundamentals, with no mention of Energy Retailers in media 
coverage. 
32 It is worth noting that by contrast, in the experience of many market participants, and as far as I am aware – orchestrated, pre-
emptive jawboning by Energy Departments and its implicit compact was not widely practiced. 
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4.2 Standing Offers and a counterfactual Benchmark 
Southeast Queensland appears to benefit from the transparent and independently determined 
Benchmark.  While the methodology does not have universal support, it is helpful because it 
is consistently applied and provides guidance for what constitutes a fair and reasonable Year-
on-Year tariff change.  It also has the unintended, but beneficial side-effect, of providing 
some degree of “cover” for incumbent retailer tariff changes.  The test of usefulness will be 
under conditions of a falling tariff determination. Other NEM regions do not have an 
independent Benchmark or tariff index, but there is nothing stopping Energy Departments 
from creating a credible one in conjunction with industry participants. 
4.3 Market Confusion or Diversity of Offers? 
The application of a Benchmark needs to be used carefully.  It will not be the ideal tariff.  A 
common criticism of the market is rising complexity as Offer structures vary amongst 
retailers.  This is not a policy problem – it is evidence of a workably competitive market.  
Occasionally, a regulator or policy advisor may be tempted to regulate the fixed component of 
the two-part tariff (or worse, ban fixed charges) in order to make comparison of retailer 
variable rates “easier”.  Ofgem pursued this concept in 2012 but quickly reversed direction  
presumably due to the sheer volume of dire warnings from industry, informed consumer 
groups and independent academic economists.  Any attempt to do so will eliminate products, 
leaving some consumers considerably worse off, and consumers as a class no better off 
(Pollitt & Haney, 2014; Littlechild, 2014).   
 
Differences in tariff structure is how retailers attack rivals and steal customers (Simshauser & 
Whish-Wilson, 2017). In an applied example, Tables 8-10 illustrate the rich variation in offers 
for small customers (20th percentile) and large customers (80th percentile). Note in Table 8 
that Red Energy’s 10% Off The Bill is the best available offer for a 20th percentile customer, 
followed by Qenergy.  Table 10 illustrates that Alinta Energy’s 25% Off Variable Rates is the 
lowest cost offer for an 80th percentile customer. 
4.4 Reference Rates: the “discount off what?” problem   
An issue that has bedevilled NEM institutional bodies, Official Advisors and a cause of 
considerable consternation amongst consumer groups has been the lack of a market 
“reference rate” from which to anchor discounts.  The complexity that exists is the non-
linearity of tariffs, different network areas (and associated network tariffs) and diversity of 
customers.  In the absence of a formal reference rate, retailer discounts become “unanchored” 
– colloquially known as the “discount off what?” problem. 
 
As noted, there is a reasonable body of evidence suggesting consumers respond best to 
“percentage off” discounts.33  But in deregulated markets discounts slowly drift away from a 
regulated tariff cap and become anchored against each retailers’ own Standing Offer, which 
for competitive reasons are not equalised.  Tables 8-10 illustrate the nature of the problem by 
ranking the top 10 Market Offers for small, reference and large customers.  Notice there are a 
mix of discounts – some off the total bill while others are off variable rates only: 
 
                                                          
33 See for example Giulietti et al. (2005), Flores & Waddams Price (2013), IPART (2013), Simshauser (2014), Littlechild (2014), 
Waddams Price & Zhu (2015), Waddams Price & Zhu (2016), He & Reiner (2017), Flores & Waddams Price (2018). 
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Table 8: Discounts off what? Annual bill for a small customer (20th percentile) 1610kWh pa 
 
 
Table 9: Discounts off what? Annual bill for reference customer 6250kWh pa 
 
 
Table 10: Discounts off what? Annual bill for a large customer (80th percentile) 8431kWh pa 
 
 
Because tariffs are non-linear, a single reference rate or Benchmark based on an average 
customer will prove misleading for small customers or large customers, as Table 8-10 
demonstrate.  Thwaites et al. (2017) suggest establishing three reference volumes (small, 
medium and large consuming households) and reference rates from which to anchor 
discounts.  This suggestion is prima facie sensible, although with solar PV, ripple control 
metering and other emerging developments such as Electric Vehicles and Batteries, three 
reference volumes quickly and necessarily expands to 10-20 reference volume combinations 
to accommodate consumer preferences for solar export meters (i.e. to access FiT), and 
controllable load metering for hot-water and pool pumps (Tariffs 31 and 33) and yet to be 
designed tariffs for EVs and Battery Storage.   
 
The Australian Energy Regulator’s website EnergyMadeEasy enables households to enter a 
few basic details, and then stacks the various Offers according to set criteria (e.g. lowest cost, 
highest Feed-in Tariff etc).  The Regulator has thus far been reluctant to establish a reference 
rate, primarily to avoid the risk of partial re-regulation.  This remains an area for further 




















Benchmark 87.1 25.9 20.5 $717 $0 0.0
Red Energy 102.7 23.3 20.9 10% Off Total Bill $668 -$50 6.9
Qenergy 120.0 30.6 28.6 17% Off Total Bill $674 -$44 6.1
Alinta Energy 101.8 26.0 22.0 25% Off Variable Rates $676 -$42 5.8
Powershop 104.2 26.8 25.1 16% Off Total Bill $677 -$40 5.6
Simply Energy 89.9 28.0 25.4 20% Off Variable Rates $682 -$35 4.9
Lumo Energy 102.7 25.1 20.9 10% Off Total Bill $688 -$29 4.1
Momentum 87.1 25.9 20.5 $717 $0 0.0
AGL Energy 103.0 26.0 22.0 15% Off Variable Rates $721 $3 -0.5
Energy Locals 112.0 25.0 23.0 8% Off Total Bill $734 $16 -2.2




















Benchmark 87.1 25.9 20.5 $1,869 $0 0.0
Alinta Energy 101.8 26.0 22.0 25% Off Variable Rates $1,553 -$316 16.9
Qenergy 120.0 30.6 28.6 17% Off Total Bill $1,593 -$275 14.7
Red Energy 102.7 23.3 20.9 10% Off Total Bill $1,620 -$248 13.3
Dodo Power & Gas 121.9 26.3 22.3 25% Off Variable Rates $1,638 -$231 12.3
Origin Energy 117.0 24.5 20.5 16% Off Variable Rates $1,671 -$197 10.6
Lumo Energy 102.7 25.1 20.9 10% Off Total Bill $1,699 -$169 9.1
Energy Australia 117.0 26.6 21.1 20% Off Variable Rates $1,701 -$168 9.0
Simply Energy 89.9 28.0 25.4 20% Off Variable Rates $1,703 -$166 8.9
Powershop 104.2 26.8 25.1 16% Off Total Bill $1,709 -$160 8.6




















Benchmark 87.1 25.9 20.5 $2,410 $0 0.0
Alinta Energy 101.8 26.0 22.0 25% Off Variable Rates $1,965 -$445 18.5
Qenergy 120.0 30.6 28.6 17% Off Total Bill $2,026 -$384 15.9
Dodo Power & Gas 121.9 26.3 22.3 25% Off Variable Rates $2,054 -$355 14.7
Red Energy 102.7 23.3 20.9 10% Off Total Bill $2,068 -$342 14.2
Origin Energy 117.0 24.5 20.5 16% Off Variable Rates $2,106 -$304 12.6
Energy Australia 117.0 26.6 21.1 20% Off Variable Rates $2,145 -$264 11.0
Lumo Energy 102.7 25.1 20.9 10% Off Total Bill $2,174 -$235 9.8
AGL Energy 103.0 26.0 22.0 15% Off Variable Rates $2,182 -$228 9.5
Simply Energy 89.9 28.0 25.4 20% Off Variable Rates $2,183 -$227 9.4
Powershop 104.2 26.8 25.1 16% Off Total Bill $2,194 -$216 9.0
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4.5 Rising price dispersion 
Price discrimination and rising dispersion of prices is not a mode of failure.  The theoretical 
and applied literature and evidence from other markets show this to be consistent with market 
participants responding to heightened competition.  As Table 7 demonstrates, competition is a 
better form of consumer protection than regulation.  Indeed, the doubling of consumer 
electricity prices in Queensland and other regions from 2007-2014 was driven by rising 
network charges; regulation of network prices failed spectacularly. Conversely, the 
competitive segments of the market, generation and retailing, are the reason that discounts 
below Benchmark exist in the first place. 
 
Above all, attempts to stamp out the practice of price discrimination, including misguided 
calls by Prime Ministers to move “all customers onto the cheapest available tariff” can be 
relied on to achieve one crucial outcome – the elimination of deep discounts (see Hviid & 
Waddams Price, 2012; Pollitt & Haney, 2014; Littlechild, 2014, 2016).   
4.6 Best price or better price? 
Thwaites et al. (2017) observed the best Market Offers in Victoria require consumers to 
switch regularly and remain engaged, that challenges exist in finding the best Offer, and 
benefits deteriorate sharply if the second, third or fourth best offer is selected. These 
characteristics were classed as failures and formed part of the justification for a stripped-back 
tariff or Basic Service Offer.     
 
That consumers need to remain engaged in a market, any market, to secure good deals should 
come as no surprise to policymakers and does not warrant policy intervention.  Other essential 
consumables like bottled milk are very cheap at Supermarkets and very expensive at 24-hour 
convenience stores, but this does not represent a failed market.  Vulnerable customers aside, 
consumers should be trusted to make adult decisions34 with the different electricity retailers 
and their different business models and products. 
 
The suggestion that ‘benefits deteriorate sharply’ with the second, third and fourth-best offer 
is not supported by the evidence in Tables 8-10.  If there is a large variation between first- and 
remaining rival offers it is more likely to reflect a retailer trying to enter a market or market-
segment, claw-back lost customers prior to announcing year-end results to the stock 
exchange, or a retailer seeking to unwind an over-hedged position; rather than 19 
uncompetitive and incompetent rivals.  Moreover, electricity tariffs are non-linear, 
consequently, the best Market Offer for a 1610kWh/a customer is most unlikely to be the best 
Market Offer for an 8,431kWh/a customer as Tables 8-10 demonstrate.   
 
Furthermore, measuring the second, third, and fourth-best offers and above as sub-optimal 
and comprising an apparent failed market by comparison to the lowest available offer is 
disingenuous.  It fails to distinguish legitimate producer surplus (i.e. recovery of sunk capital, 
operating and overhead costs), normal from supranormal profits, retail-only from legitimate 
vertical-retailer costs, and overlooks the array of conditions and services available to 
consumers with rival products.  In Southeast Queensland, welfare agencies routinely direct 
vulnerable customers to either of the two incumbent retailers, Origin Energy and AGL 
Energy, due to their 24-hour call centres, known levels of customer service, payment 
flexibility and completeness of hardship schemes.   
 
With the notable exception of vulnerable households, it is not the role of policymakers or 
Official Advisors to construct policy that ensure customers are on the best available tariff.  
Policymakers have a responsibility to ensure an orderly, transparent and workably 
                                                          
34 Indeed, as Littlechild (2014) has previously argued, policymakers and their advisors seem to trust consumers to make 
enormous financial commitments on other essentials.  Household expenditure data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
reveals that for Australians, this includes housing (18.62% of household income), food (16.09% of household income) and 
telecommunications (2.59% of household income) yet fear the same households are unable to navigate the procurement of 
electricity (2.17% of household income).  Source: Australian household expenditure data from Australian Bureau of Statistics at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/6473.0Sep%202017?OpenDocument 
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competitive market.  Product selection is the responsibility of consumers.  As the head of 
energy policy at St Vincent de Paul has said to the author on any number of occasions, 
“consumers should simply aim to get on a better deal, not torture themselves trying to find the 
absolute best deal”. 
4.7 Inter-consumer misallocation problem 
Of all the issues facing policymakers with deregulated residential electricity markets, the 
inter-consumer misallocation problem is, in my opinion, the most important and worthy of 
attention from both industry and policymakers alike.  As an essential service, policymakers 
cannot allow a deregulated electricity market to injure households.  Corporates must respect 
this simple proposition and work with policymakers and Official Advisors.  Resolution 
requires simple remedies.  This was the focus of Simshauser & Whish-Wilson (2017) – if 
Standing Offers of incumbent retailers drift above a counterfactual ‘Benchmark’ and if any 
customers on that Standing Offer also have a welfare flag (i.e. vulnerable), that group of 
customers should be automatically transferred to a discounted product competitive with 
Benchmark.  A “no action” agreement from regulatory authorities is important; customers 
cannot be assigned to a new product without their Explicit Informed Consent – but in these 
circumstances there is an unambiguous welfare improvement and as such regulatory 
authorities should support the change. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The policy of price deregulation in residential electricity markets has come under sharp focus 
in two of the pioneering jurisdictions, Great Britain and Victoria.  Central to regulatory and 
policymaker concern has been the apparent fairness arising from third-degree price 
discrimination.  However, in both Great Britain and Victoria, general electricity prices had 
been increasing sharply in prior periods. 
 
Sharply rising electricity prices are a problem.  Third degree price discrimination is not.  
There is nothing inherently unfair about price discrimination in workably competitive 
markets; on the contrary, it is frequently welfare enhancing – especially in heavy industries – 
and efforts to stamp out the practice are likely to do more harm than good.  Evidence from 
Great Britain is that it inflamed prices. 
 
In this article, Queensland was analysed due to its unique characteristic of a single wholesale 
region with the two extremities of retail markets, viz. a fully contestable and deregulated 
retail market (Southeast Queensland) sitting along-side a fully regulated monopoly supplier 
(Regional Queensland).  The deregulated market is evolving in a manner consistent with the 
literature; as price controls were removed the number of rivals increased from 12 to 20, 
products and tariff structures proliferated, routine discounts deepened, customer switching 
rates increased sharply, and price dispersion increased materially by comparison to the pre-
deregulated contestable market, let alone the uniform-priced regulated regional market.   
 
Unlike Victoria, price dispersion in Southeast Queensland has not arisen as a political focus 
event even though the distance between the highest Standing Offer and deepest discount is 
equivalent to Victoria, i.e. 35%.   
 
Above all, quantitative analysis presented in this article found a majority (78.9%) of 
Southeast Queensland electricity consumers have benefited from deregulation, some 
significantly, and consumers as a whole are substantially better off.  The competitive market 
has been successful at regulating overall average prices.  Some Standing Offers have risen 
above the counterfactual Benchmark, and this means two key issues will require monitoring; 
1). the inter-consumer misallocation problem (i.e. vulnerable customers rusted-on to a 
Standing Offer tariff designed for strong segment consumers), and 2). the “discounts off 
what?” problem.   
 
With a rising dispersion and volume of Standing Offer tariffs, discounted products can be 
misleading and the problem here is an obvious one.  If a retailer offers an 18% discounted 
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product immediately after increasing their Standing Offer by 18%, what discount is the 
customer actually receiving?  Resolving the former matter is relatively straight forward via 
moving vulnerable customers onto a Benchmark-equivalent discounted tariff.  Due to the non-
linearity of tariffs and the rising mix of discrete metered loads, the latter can be best solved by 
producing a weighted average of Standing Offers, and using this as the benchmark. 
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